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Abstract 
 
Children tend to be missing from the literature on human rights. Sociology can help 
to fill the gap by providing evidence about the importance and benefits of recognising 
children’s human rights, the dangers of not doing so, and joint rights-promoting work 
by adults and children. However, sociology has paid relatively little attention to 
human rights, and to the related topics of the Holocaust, human nature, real bodies, 
universal principles and moral imperatives. This paper examines splits in sociology 
around a central absence, which could partly explain these omissions. Then it 
considers how inter-disciplinary approaches and critical realism can help to theorise 
and validate “the inherent dignity and...the equal and inalienable rights of all 
members of the human family”. The youngest children’s rights illuminate meanings in 
all human rights, which depend less on the rational person approach than on 
recognising human nature, vulnerability and solidarity interacting with social 
structures.  
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Introduction 
 
This discussion paper reviews how, and possibly why, children are often missing 
from the mainly adult-centred, academic and popular literature on human rights. 
Writers imply that human rights belong mainly to adults and are separate from 
children’s rights.  Sociology can help to fill these gaps by providing evidence about 
the importance and benefits of recognising children as full human beings with human 
rights, the dangers of not doing so, and ways in which adults and children work 
together to promote everyone’s human rights. However, mainstream sociology has 
tended to be ambivalent and to pay relatively little attention to children, to human 
rights generally, and to topics which are arguably closely related to rights: the 
Holocaust, real bodies, human nature, universal principles and moral imperatives. 
This paper examines splits in sociological theories and methods around a central 
absence, which could help to explain these omissions. Then I will consider how inter-
disciplinary approaches and critical realism can help to theorise “recognition of the 
inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human 
family [as] the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world” (United 
Nations, 1948). The youngest children’s rights illustrate a reality in human rights that 
is not founded on the rational person, but on recognition of human nature, 
vulnerability and solidarity interacting with policy structures.  
  The sociologist Michael Freeman (2011) considers that one task of social science is 
to bring human rights supporters and lawyers back to reality, by connecting abstract 
notions of rights into their social contexts, structures and meanings, where normative 
philosophy, law and social science meet. Woodiwiss (2005) and Hynes et al. (2011) 
also contend that sociology can analyse the complex meanings and relevance of 
human rights in numerous social processes and relationships. Freeman (2011:118) 
believes that divisions between social science and philosophy, which attempt to 
“purify” the disciplines, have advantages but also costs. The problems posed “can be 
met only by intellectual activity that crosses the boundaries we have set up”. This 
paper considers how we can understand more about the reality of human rights and 
about sociology by crossing traditional academic boundaries, and by transcending 
debilitating splits, contradictions and dichotomies (which reduce things into two 
opposing sides: human becomes adult/child).  
  Children might seem to disappear from much of this paper. However, this is 
because I want to show that supposedly “adult” matters of economics and politics 
affect everyone of all ages, and their rights. Feminists showed that women were both 
invisible in pre-1970s male-centred sociology, but were also inevitably central to it. 
Feminists also assert that society can only properly be understood by taking account 
of women as well as men. Similarly, this paper argues that children and young 
people are (still too often) invisible in adult-centric sociology and human rights 
literature. Yet in being over one third of humanity, they are central. Accounts that 
omit them are therefore skewed and partial, and relate to the vital theme in critical 
realism of absence (see below). Instead of repeatedly writing “and also children”, I 
take “human” and “society” to mean everyone of all ages.  
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  The lawyer Michael Freeman (2012, and see 2007) contends in his edited 
interdisciplinary book on childhood studies and the law: “All areas of law [and 
therefore of rights] impact upon children, and have concepts of childhood”. But 
Freeman shows how traditional concepts of children and childhood are often 
assumed, and are not explicitly recognised or questioned. Real children are then 
absent in a sense of being submerged below the level of conscious discourse, 
decisions and policy making. Supreme Court judge Brenda Hale (2011) recounted 
how children and their rights are repeatedly overlooked in the courts. She cited 
examples of lawyers using children’s Article 12 rights to express their views merely 
to reassure and partially inform children, but not to listen to them or learn from them. 
Parents of young children frequently receive prison sentences with no thought, Hale 
considers, of the children, despite the 1989 Children Act, and Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, UNCRC (UN, 1989) Article 3: 
  
“In all actions concerning children, whether taken by public or private social 
welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative 
bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.” 
 
Children are too often absent, in terms of being present  and centrally relevant but 
invisible, unheard, excluded, ignored or unconsidered, not only in the law courts, but 
also in the whole criminal justice system when parents’ prison sentences could 
impose on their children worse deprivation, emotional suffering and stigma than the 
parents might endure in prison. Since almost everything in society concerns children, 
“all matters affecting the child” (UNCRC, 1989: Article 12) applies to almost 
everything too.   
  If children are specifically included only sometimes, it is inadvertently implied that 
they are absent at all other times. This a major problem created by the UNCRC and 
its supposed creation of children’s rights, which diverts attention from “everyone’s” 
rights in older Conventions. This can perpetuate the default assumption that only 
adults count, unless children happen to be mentioned. One purpose of my paper, 
however, is to promote the default assumption to include children, and then to justify 
any specific exclusion.  This paper is neither about rights exclusive to young 
children, nor much about the UNCRC, except in the many rights the UNCRC shares 
with other conventions (such as UN, 1948; EC, 1950). The paper is about how 
seeing young children aged 0-8 years as rights holders might increase our 
understanding of the civil and economic rights that are shared by every human 
being. This theoretical paper has developed from my related, more practical books 
(Alderson, 2008; Alderson and Morrow, 2011).  
  Instead of reporting an empirical research project, this paper reviews problems in 
the current sociology of human rights, with suggested ways to analyse and resolve 
them. It will draw on the fairly new philosophy of critical realism – CR (Bhaskar 1998, 
2008, 2010, 2011). Central to this paper and to CR is the difference between 
ontology (here meaning being, real existence and functioning) and epistemology 
(here meaning knowing, thinking, perceiving, understanding, describing, explaining). 
4 
 
CR contends that most philosophy and sociology collapses being into knowing, 
things into thoughts and, for example, real living children into concepts, beliefs and 
discourses about childhood. Although CR texts are dense, after nearly 30 years as a 
sociologist I find them immensely useful in explaining and resolving deep problems 
in social research, and I aim to explain ideas from CR as clearly as possible 
(Alderson, in press). 
  An ontology of human morality and human rights (their existence, nature and 
function) has a stronger basis if it connects with an ontology of human nature and 
can show how: 1) the ends of the morality and rights are conducive to human good 
and flourishing (interdependent with other species, nature and the planet); 2) the 
means through which we desire and aim to achieve this good are not simply arbitrary 
or synthetic, but are authentically part of human nature, in their origins, processes 
and effects.  
  However, in order to define their discipline, sociologists have set knowing over 
being, culture over nature. They have tended to select narrow concepts of the social, 
and to research contingent culture and empirical data, separated from universal 
nature, philosophical inquiry and underlying, invisible causes (Bhaskar 1998). There 
are also deep divisions and contradictions between positivist and interpretive, 
qualitative and quantitative, micro and macro approaches to childhood research.   
  One example of splits and omissions is that it was not until the sixtieth annual 
British Sociological Association (BSA) conference in 2011 that the very first stream 
on human rights was convened. Yet readers hardly need to be reminded that human 
rights are of immense, long-standing and international social concern. The BSA was 
set up in 1951, shortly after the catalyst for the recognition of international human 
rights (United Nations, 1948; European Council, 1950), and also for international 
research ethics (Nuremberg Code, 1947). The catalyst was the Nuremberg Trials 
held after the Holocaust. A related omission in sociology is inattention to research 
ethics and participants’ rights. In contrast to decades of ethics activity in healthcare 
research stemming from Nuremberg (many conferences and courses, books and 
journals, reports and agreed standards, formal review committees and the new 
discipline of bioethics), social researchers only began to accept routine, formal ethics 
review of their work during this century (ESRC, 2005).        
  In order to consider possible origins of, and justifications for, human rights that are 
rooted in human nature, this paper is relevant to the social and natural sciences and 
humanities concerned with human life. I will ask: Can moral values and rights be 
universal or only contingent and local? When does something seemingly as enduring 
as the individual human person and rights holder begin?  And how might critical 
realism help to increase understanding of young children’s human rights? 
  The following sections review the history of sociology in ways that I hope practical 
readers will find useful. Sociology analyses and informs everyday public opinions 
and values, and examines unseen, underlying beliefs and processes, which may be 
aiding or blocking social progress. Success in slow reform, such as on women’s and 
children’s rights, involves understanding these deeper resistances and enablers. I 
will first consider four selected major strands in sociology that have influenced public 
5 
 
values and policies. Then I will review contradictions and dichotomies among the 
four strands, and critiques about them. Later sections will outline a few selected 
themes from critical realism to show how these can illuminate human rights and help 
to resolve contradictions. The CR themes include absence, ontology and 
epistemology, depth realism, closed and open systems, structure and agency, and 
four planar social being.   
 
 
Four major strands in sociology 
 
Twentieth century sociology developed through international collaboration.  Leading 
American sociologists studied and worked at times in Germany. Contact increased 
during the 1930s, with refugees from continental Europe fleeing to the USA and UK. 
From Marx and Durkheim onwards most prominent founding sociologists were 
Jewish, and sociology could be said to owe its existence to them. The Holocaust 
directly affected many sociologists, when they sought asylum and when their 
relatives and/or friends perished in the concentration camps. Yet unlike historians, 
sociologists have maintained almost complete silence about the Holocaust (from the 
Greek “whole” and “burnt”). The sociologist Zygmunt Bauman (2003:175-6) 
considered their silence on one of the extreme social events of the twentieth century, 
after his wife spent two years writing about her time in a concentration camp. 
Bauman believed that the general avoidance or denial were partly defences against 
the pain and horror of instinctive moral revulsion. Sociologists’ tactics have included: 
ignoring atrocities and the physical torment of the body; explaining them away as 
unique and irrelevant to a theory of morality; regarding them as exceptions that 
prove the rule and mark the boundaries of morality; or retreating into moral 
relativism. Bauman identifies all these responses in sociology from the 1940s.   
  Sociologists’ general silence and defensive anxieties may have been accentuated 
into this century by the further wars, atrocities and genocides. From a wide range of 
sociological groups or schools, I have selected four broad strands developed around 
the 1940s and 1950s. These illustrate different tacit or overt reactions to the 
Holocaust, and by association to the violation and defence of human rights. The 
reactions could have contributed to deepening the gaps and splits in sociology, along 
with many older divisions (Gouldner, 1971; Bhaskar, 1998). Before human rights can 
be accepted generally in mainstream sociology, it may be necessary to rethink 
widespread assumptions propagated by these disparate strands, which this section 
will briefly review.  
 
1 Structural functionalism 
Talcott Parsons and structural functionalists, through a kind of remote optimism that 
denied the dangers of an over-powerful state, seem determined to show just how 
civilised society can be. They saw society as a great organism or system, functioning 
for the good of all, inexorably preventing social breakdown, and defending “American 
values” against communism and fascism. They shared Durkheim’s and Weber’s view 
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that, to qualify as science, sociology must (at least appear to) be value-free, and so 
they emphasised practical utility rather than moral principles. Weber’s respectful 
Verstehen (understanding) of different cultures and moralities (implicitly countering 
the idea of one universal morality) was also deeply influential (Gouldner, 1971; 
Bhaskar, 1998; Bauman, 2003). Parsons (1951) emphasised the social, partly by 
demoting the natural; for example, physical bodily disease and suffering transferred 
into the social, compliant sick role. Parsons shared Durkheim’s (1956) concepts of 
morality emerging within each society in a God-like collective conscience, which 
rescues individuals from blind, unthinking, physical forces and natural animal 
passions. This morality serves to strengthen orderly cohesion, and is sustained 
through socialising and educating each new generation into compliance, with 
correction of deviance. Human rights are hardly necessary if governments are 
correct and benign, and functionalists would regard the birth of human rights through 
protest as deviance that requires correction not respect. Sociologists’ confidence 
increased in promoting science, technology and wealth creation through efficient and 
inevitably proliferating bureaucracy. Weber (1970:214) described bureaucracy before 
he died in 1920, and inadvertently forecast the Holocaust:  
 
“Precision, speed... knowledge of the files, continuity, discretion, unity, strict 
subordination, reduction of friction and...costs, the ‘objective’ discharge of 
business according to calculable rules and ‘without regard for persons’ - or for 
personal initiative.”  
   
2. Interpretivism 
Claiming similar value-freedom, a second strand could be seen as containing 
Holocaust-related anxiety by “bracketing off” macro concerns of politics, justice, 
power and economics as well as the physical world (and real bodies and suffering). 
This interpretive group positioned the social within detailed micro encounters and 
negotiated meaning. They saw reality (being) not as real but as a form of 
consciousness (knowing), in such sociological approaches as: phenomenology 
(individual meaning making); social constructionism (Alfred Schütz, also Peter 
Berger and Thomas Luckmann); ethnomethodology (Harold Garfinkel); and 
discourse analysis. At Chicago, research by symbolic interactionists (Herbert 
Blumer, Howard Becker, Erving Goffman, Louis Wirth and Eliot Freidson, with 
sociologist/economist Gary Becker who worked on human capital) and grounded 
theorists (Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss) mainly avoided reference to the 
Holocaust or to human rights, despite their relevance to such research topics as total 
institutions or stages of awareness of dying. Concepts of the distinct moral self as a 
rights holder became fragmented into a series of presentations and performances by 
“merchants of morality” (Goffman, 1969:222). Berger and Kellner (1981:141-2) firmly 
divorce sociology from morality, saying that the futile search for seductive ideologies, 
such as Marxism, and religions that offer existential hope and moral guidance must, 
with all fanaticism, be avoided. Childhood studies is mainly influenced by this strand, 
when sociologists, geographers and anthropologists study a range of very diverse 
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childhoods, and show how these are socially constructed and not biologically 
determined. Researchers thereby challenge psycho-medical theories of universal 
child development (James and Prout, 1997). This can be emancipatory when 
accounts of young children in the poorer Majority world who run small businesses 
(Invernizzi, 2008), or work as soldiers (Brett and Specht, 2004) refute Western 
assumptions about 8 year olds’ inevitable rather helpless dependence.  
  Later in this interpretive tradition, Bryan Turner (2008) made a vital sociological 
defence of human rights, which he connected to religion, to evil, and to the animal 
vulnerability and prolonged childhood of human beings. We need rights because we 
are easily harmed, and not fully protected by our social institutions; we share a core 
value of “collective compassion” and responsibility to relieve each others’ misery. 
However, Turner tended to split the social and thinking about bodies, from the 
natural and humans existing in and as bodies. He stated that sociologists are mainly 
concerned with the former, with “cultural decoding of the body as a system of 
meaning” and also “the phenomenological study of embodiment” and practices 
(Turner, 2008:15).    
 
3. Critical theory 
A very different strand was more critical of oppression and the Holocaust. They 
included in the USA Everett Hughes, who wrote a rare critique of Nazism, C Wright 
Mills and Alvin Gouldner. There was also the Frankfurt School, temporary exiles in 
New York during World War II. Despite being critical theorists, some of them tended 
to emphasise subjective psychology and to avoid history and political economy 
(Bottomore, 2002). From around 1980 to 2007, this third group’s critical Marxist 
approach, the one most likely one to address the Holocaust, lost influence, although 
today Marxism is becoming more popular, as a means to analyse today’s problems, 
which partly stem from the next and fourth group’s work.      
 
4. Econometrics 
Economics and politics were the fourth strand’s main concern. Their reaction to the 
Holocaust was to plan social reform that was supposed to be the antithesis of 
Nazism and communism. Although mainly economists and philosophers, they were 
crucial to the history of sociology with its roots, evinced by Marx, Weber and 
Parsons, in economics. The Chicago sociologists (strand 2) shared their building 
(and some researchers such as Gary Becker) with the economists. The entrance 
was inscribed “science is measurement”. Economist Milton Friedman worked there, 
with Frederick von Hayek and Karl Popper, refugees from Vienna and based at the 
London School of Economics. Their Mont Pelerin Society has propagated neoliberal 
policies throughout the world since the 1940s (Klein, 2007; Mirowski and Plehwe, 
2009).  
  Their revulsion of “serfdom” under Stalinist and Nazi atrocities fed their aspirations 
towards free, unregulated, “open” societies and markets. Neoliberal policies have 
overseen the splitting away and transfer of government funding for sociological 
research into social policy, economics, statistical and business departments, and 
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commercial agencies. Concern with social relations, the arena for human rights, has 
been colonised and overtaken by today’s most influential and well funded agendas, 
such as huge surveys and evaluations about cost-effectiveness, evidence base, and 
happiness metrics (Layard, 2006).  
  Neoliberals’ passion for a highly qualified form of freedom (of markets rather than of 
people or rights) has shaped the methods as well as the remit and topics in social 
research. Popper (1945/1965) claimed that modern science formed during the 17th 
century Enlightenment was “perhaps the greatest of all moral and spiritual 
revolutions of history” although it “has created powers of appalling destructiveness; 
but they may yet be conquered” when people “free themselves and their minds from 
the tutelage of authority and prejudice” and “build up an open society”. They do so 
through freely subjecting any idea or tradition to rigorous deductive research and 
falsification, to see whether it can “measure up to their standards of freedom, of 
humaneness, and of rational criticism”. Then they can “share the burden of 
responsibility for avoidable suffering, and...work for its avoidance”. These high ideals 
have informed, for example, the international Cochrane Collaboration (Chalmers, 
2005), which tests the cost-benefit evidence of interventions in many health, social 
and education services.    
 
Splits between these four strands are epitomised in the example of Alfred Schütz. A 
fellow economics student with Hayek in Vienna, he escaped to New York in the 
1930s. He re-established his career as a banker and attended Mont Pelerin 
meetings (strand 4), while he also developed sociological phenomenology (strand 2), 
largely divorced from economic, political, material and moral considerations. The four 
strands contradict one another’s theories, aims and methods: whether to measure 
and assume everyday reality, or to try to understand while doubting that anything is 
real or universal.     
 
 
Critiques of the four strands 
 
Criticisms of the strands’ continuing influences, particularly relating to social research 
about human rights and children, will now be reviewed. Some of the gaps between 
these four traditions have narrowed, such as in the present most active area of 
research about children (funded by Government departments and research councils, 
the International Monetary Fund and similar agencies). Commissioned research 
synthesises functionalist maintenance of social order (strand 1) with positivist 
surveys (strand 4), stored in vast databanks, of children’s cost-related needs and 
performance and the services that support and control them. Children are implicitly 
burdens, or investments and future funders of older generations’ pensions and 
debts, rather than unique persons and rights holders (for example, Dex and Joshi, 
2005). The birth cohort to begin in 2012 at University College London has initial 
funding of £33 million.  
9 
 
  Gouldner and Bauman mistrusted the enforced consensus of functionalism, 
considering that intellectual and moral knowledge develop through difference and 
conflict, through informal being-with-the other and, like Socrates, stepping out of 
assigned roles. Gouldner (1971) analysed how functionalism in the well-ordered 
social organism is inexorably utilitarian when it values each part according to its 
functioning or utility, including morality that is designed to promote order and 
efficiency but not justice. Bauman and others, such as Hannah Arendt, conclude that 
the Holocaust was not a failure of modern civilisation, but its product. They invert 
Weber’s and Parson’s smooth bureaucratic rules, contending that ordinary, good 
people can commit evil when they obey experts’ orders, transfer responsibility up the 
hierarchy, and fail to regard victims as persons. For Bauman (2003), the 
perpetrators, bystanders and the relatively rare protestors during the Holocaust offer 
the ultimate lesson about the extent of human good and evil. He identifies morality 
not with obedience to Durkheim’s enforced norms, but with the exceptional courage 
to protest, and to follow individual conscience, particularly in unjust and murderous 
societies. This courage sets principles of solidarity and altruism above personal 
survival, and is expressed by the Arab protestors in 2011 who said, “We will die for 
our freedom”, implying their willingness to die for other people’s freedom. They 
dispel myths that only Westerners value universal freedom and solidarity rights.  
  As mentioned earlier, Durkheim (1956) viewed each society as the source of all its 
own morality; he assessed morality for its efficient maintenance of public order, and 
education for its induction into compliant citizenship. However, these views prevent 
sociologists from independently evaluating or comparing different moralities, if they 
are all assumed to be fairly equal and only understood within their own terms. The 
views assume that pre-social individuals (children) and noncompliant people are 
dysfunctional, immoral or amoral. Compliance is seen as the sole moral option when 
“actions are evil because they are socially prohibited, rather than socially prohibited 
because they are evil” (Bauman, 2003:173). Complete faith in the rulers who 
determine the norms ignores how rulers cannot guarantee virtue and may twist 
norms to serve corrupt interests. Contingent “moralities”, which are produced and 
promoted within each society, deny the possibility of universal principles and 
therefore of universal human rights. They also undermine the value and importance 
of morality itself, because if moralities are interchangeable, their purpose and nature 
become questionable if not expendable.  
  The view that moral norms have to be enforced on inevitably antisocial young 
children implies that morality works against human nature. Bauman asks, however: If 
we are all born primitive savages where do societies’ notions of goodness come 
from? How can we imagine or invent them if they are so alien to our nature?  He 
contends that the universal morality is the courage to follow individual conscience, to 
defend and be willing to die for justice and solidarity. “For sociological theory, the 
very idea of pre-social grounds of moral behaviour augurs the necessity of a radical 
revision of traditional interpretation of the origins of the sources of moral norms and 
the obligatory power” (Bauman, 2003:177). Although he does not develop this point, 
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Bauman raises possibilities to be considered later about innate morality in early “pre-
social” childhood.  
  Other dichotomies in sociology remain. Ageist mainstream research continues to 
ignore children and to address the “adult world” (formerly the world of “Man”), of 
which nevertheless children are an essential integral part. In tandem, most of the 
“new” childhood studies separately “begins, and to some extent ends, with the study 
of children and childhood” (James, 2010:215-6). But how does childhood end? In 
time, the age that ends childhood is varied and uncertain. In space, boundaries 
between childhood and adulthood are also fluctuating and porous, and virtually every 
part of society interacts with childhood.  
  When directly researching children’s own views as social actors, researchers rely 
on the micro, interpretive approaches of strand 2, mainly separated from the larger 
concerns of strands 1, 3 and 4. Over-emphasis on contingent beliefs and 
behaviours, and on “childhood as a continually experienced and created social 
phenomenon” (James and Prout, 1997:245), can veer into cultural relativism, which 
risks rejecting universal structures, principles and rights. Lukes (2008) critiques 
relativism saying that seemingly equal respect for every culture ends by respecting 
nothing but tolerance, as if that is higher than justice and other principles. And 
tolerance is an oddly negative concept; we do not “tolerate” things we love and 
admire. Lukes argues that we can respect locally varied expressions of underlying 
universal principles.  
  A further problem is social constructionists’ double standards when they state, for 
example, that “the researcher is not the knower of truth but rather the recorder and 
interpreter of multiple ‘other’ social subjectivities” (Beazley et al., 2009:369). Yet if 
there is no truth, how can that statement, as well as researchers’ own texts, be more 
than “social subjectivities” without any essential, transferable meaning or relevance 
across place or time? Without some stable realities, how can we avoid infinite 
regress? 
  Turner’s important validation of human rights partly shares strand 2’s underlying 
dichotomies: thinking versus being; warning “not to reify ‘the body’” (2008:245) as if 
bodies are not real; powerful but unreliable structures versus weak, anonymous 
agents; relative inattention to politics, economics and history; sociological theories 
with a Nazi-influenced past, but a supposedly value-free present. The dichotomies 
can inhibit attention to two matters essential to the study of the origins of human 
rights: real bodies and human agents interacting with political structures; and how 
and why rights have been so much ignored in sociology. Turner attributes his model 
of human vulnerability back to Nietzsche, via Arnold Gehlen who is “controversial”, 
Turner says because he was a senior Nazi official and later a neoconservative - and 
also to Peter Berger who, despite spending his youth in Nazi Germany, celebrated 
powerful structures in his 1967 book, The Sacred Canopy. Gehlen (1988, quoted in 
Turner, 2008:9-11) considered that “Men” are “not yet finished animals” and survival 
depends on a long education, self-discipline, training and correction, and creating 
strong, stable, cultural institutions and habits, to give life coherence and meaning 
and relief from instinctual drives. Gehlen opposed all change as corrosive, and 
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warned against the dangers of criticising institutions. If these points had been made 
during the 2011 “Arab spring”, they would be expressed by the dictators rather than 
by protestors who were claiming their human rights. Turner (2008:10) notes that 
Gehlen’s “work has been, somewhat paradoxically, important in the development of 
social constructionism”, which assumes that because we cannot constantly reflect on 
countless everyday aspects of daily life, we subconsciously project a pragmatic, 
taken-for-granted, factual character on to the social world. To expose this illusion, 
Garfinkel conducted ethnographic “degradation” experiments, which Gouldner 
(1971:390-5) criticised as cruel.  
  Garfinkel illustrates that one danger in applying “value-free” standards from natural 
science to social science is inattention to ethics, as if research with and about people 
can be morally equivalent in its means and ends to research on particles. Value-free 
positivism can endorse moral indifference; interpretive research can lead to moral 
relativism; social constructionism can imply that bodies and suffering do not really 
exist or matter, and researchers who attempt neutrality and ignore conflict and 
discrepancies of power and interests are liable to support the powerful status quo 
(Gouldner, 1971; Bauman 2003; Freeman, 2011:117-8). The requirement that social 
science should be value free paradoxically makes a moral claim “should”, not a 
factual claim that “social science is value free”, since it frequently is not. So the edict 
breaks the rule that it is attempting to impose. Even Popper (1945/1965) hedged his 
implacable claims to objectivity in research within broader moral truth claims about 
freedom and opposing error and fraud. 
  Morality is so intrinsic to the human condition and relationships, that efforts to 
research the social world objectively, to separate empirical fact from moral value, 
cannot delete morality. Gouldner (1971) considers that these efforts simply remap 
and reorder the world towards other moralities of prudence or profit, utility or rule-
keeping or, in Goffman’s case, appearance. The usual human assumption is to 
equate power with goodness. When “value-free” utilitarianism frequently pronounces 
that things of power (such as finance) lack morality, and things of value (such as 
rights and justice) lack power, this is generally felt to be incongruous (Gouldner, 
1971:84f). Older moralities arising from human nature, attachment, and shared need, 
the virtues of “kindness, courage, civility, loyalty, love, generosity and gratitude” have 
been replaced by calculating rational self-interest, which dismisses virtue as 
sentiment, “thinly disguises avarice”, and resolves personal worth into exchange 
value (1971:75). Beyond treating children as commodities to be individually priced 
and labelled, the industrial scale of the research databanks treats them as nameless 
cohorts of risk probabilities (Dex and Joshi, 2005). To replace moral judgements with 
use judgements increases the hazards of anomie (Gouldner, 1971), and children are 
especially vulnerable, when adults make utilitarian decisions, if children’s own views, 
reasoning and present wellbeing are discounted, and they are treated as “other” (not 
yet human beings or rights holders), as expendable means and future outcomes to 
serve adults’ ends. If moral incentives are assumed to be rewards and punishments, 
but not personal motivation or commitment, then altruistic morality is tacitly seen as 
extrinsic and contradictory to selfish human nature. Gouldner (1971) considers that 
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social research (influenced by strands 1 and 4) can serve to measure function, to 
justify allocating resources by merit rather than need, and to allay anxieties about 
exploitation and inequality, by lending the sanction of science to public policy. Hynes 
et al. (2011:826-77) identify a range of positions, from partisan or critically engaged 
and committed, to sceptical and even cynical, which all have a moral as well as an 
intellectual basis. 
  In strand 4, Popper’s and Hayek’s complex, professed ideals of freedom and the 
prevention of avoidable harm sit uneasily with the effects of their neoliberal policies 
in today’s extremes of poverty, inequality, and punitive repression of the poor (Klein, 
2007). The free movements they advocated of capital, trade and labour result in the 
mass migration of workers, reduction of wages and the fragmentation of families 
(Wacquant, 2009), powerfully affecting children and all their human rights. It is ironic 
that human rights, concerned with solidarity and equity (United Nations 1948, 1989), 
are frequently misunderstood and dismissed as the atomised, selfish individualism 
that neoliberals advocate. Neoliberals assume that managed structures weaken 
individual liberty whereas, paradoxically, the Arab protests illustrate how stronger 
democratic and legal structures can strengthen human agency and freedom. This is 
understood in interactive, dialectical theories of structure and agency, rather than 
within dichotomous ones.      
  The lawyer Conor Gearty (2011) sees human rights as “the ethical architecture  
necessary to decent everyday life” and “the only contemporary idea with true 
universal and progressive appeal...too important to leave to the liberals, the market-
slaves or the neo-conservatives”. Rights are one of the few present ethical resources 
we have, in the Western “post-socialist, post-religious haze of market supremacy”, 
when rights respect everyone’s dignity through structures of accountability to an 
independent rule of law, community self-government and, especially, equity. Gearty 
considers that rights connect wealthier Minority world countries to the energetic 
radicalism of the poorer Majority world and their claims to rights. Rights also connect 
to the best of the world’s religions. The next section considers alternative 
approaches towards a sociology of rights that bridges dichotomies. 
  
    
Critical realism and human rights  
 
Bhaskar points to a deeper problem that inhibits sociology. If morality and rights are 
solely an epistemology, a social construction of malleable floating ideas, then their 
ontology, the real independent existence, say, of lethal abuse and deprivation, the 
realities of dehydrated children and safe water, are denied. If “there are only beliefs, 
knowledge, language, descriptions, you cannot refer to anything outside beliefs” or 
critically examine what they describe or attempt to capture. Further, you cannot think 
about “a discourse which will allow you to critically evaluate our current claims to 
knowledge...its ideological function” (Bhaskar, 2011:81-2). Critical realism offers 
means to surmount these problems.     
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Absence   
From the above model of disconnected, opposing sociological strands around a 
central void, this section considers ways to explore the void, and to identify and unite 
the strengths from each position. I will begin with a major concern of CR: absence. 
Recognition of absence helps us to address voids and splits in several ways. First, it 
moves beyond the single-value assumption that only the positive can be researched 
and allows us also to examine invisibility, omission and negativity (Bhaskar, 1998). 
The relative silence in sociology on children in the mainstream literature and on 
human rights can then become both a possible and indeed a crucial topic for 
analysis of what is missing. What are the likely causes (see previous sections) and 
remedies (this section) for the absences that explain and therefore underlie these 
contradictory dichotomies and dualisms? Second, it is realistic to recognise that 
absence, all the past and future, all potential alternatives to the present here-and-
now, is infinitely larger and more powerful than presence. Bhaskar (2010) cites the 
monsoon that never arrives so that the crops perish. And there are the 2011 Arab 
protests about their violated rights and absent freedoms. Rights are at their highest 
value when they are disrespected and seem to be absent, because they are 
detailed, specific claims and tools for change, for imagining and achieving better 
futures and for absenting present oppressions. Third, recognising absence helps us 
to move beyond the fixed and static, beyond Gehlen’s fear of corrosive change. This 
is because change involves absence, not just difference; every becoming involves a 
be-going and loss of a former state. Parents who respect their children’s rights and 
growing competence have to accept the absenting and dwindling of their own 
authority and of their child’s former dependence. Fourth, one way to begin to make 
sense of negative extremes, such as genocide, is to see them as absence of good, 
which informs the desire and drive towards the freedom that absents ills and 
constraints (Bhaskar, 2008:280).    
 
Ontology and epistemology 
A further common absence in sociology is certainty about whether things really exist 
or are more accurately treated as perceptions, constructions or discourses. Everyday 
common sense tells us all that things, from oceans, to beating hearts, to laws 
inscribed on stone or parchment, to kinship ties, really exist and we have to behave 
as if they do. Yet many sociologists doubt all existence, and worry about how we can 
rely on our own and other people’s experiences, observations and accounts, or be 
certain that things continue to exist when they are not observed, or be sure that 
anything exists independently of how we perceive and construct it. These 
uncertainties influence childhood studies and the ‘social construction of childhood’. 
At great length, CR analyses the long history and the flaws in these theories, and 
concludes that the world must exist independently of our knowledge of it. Bhaskar 
(1998) contends that researchers’ defensive anxieties and inconclusive debates 
about reality displace their search for validation on to their theories (epistemology, 
relevance and coherence for interpretivists, see strand 2 and some of 3) or their 
methods (rigour, design and non-bias for empiricists and positivists strands 1 and 4). 
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However, CR asserts, validity has also to be based in the original subjects/objects of 
research (humans and other species, things, events, structures, processes, ideas) 
and in how accurately they are understood. Researchers’ over reliance on their own 
theories and methods is part of the epistemic fallacy. This reduces ontology into 
epistemology, things into (researchers’) thoughts. We need to separate the 
independent, sheer, irreducible, intransitive being (ontology) of the things we 
research, from researchers’ very different transitive knowing (epistemology). 
Sociologists who avoid the epistemic fallacy can combine positivist aspects of 
certainty of the existence of the intransitive objects and causal relationships being 
researched (strand 1 and 4), with interpretivist awareness of observers’ transitive 
subjectivities (strand 2), a combination that respects parts of both traditions. So, for 
example, we can respect the reality of the written, ratified words in UNCRC, the 
world’s millions of children, the privations they endure, and the remedies they need. 
We can also respect everyone’s varying views on how the UNCRC might be defined, 
interpreted, researched and promoted.   
 
Depth realism, open and closed systems, structure and agency    
Rights have real ontology in several ways. Depth realism has three levels (Bhaskar, 
2008). First there is empirical, sensed experience of rights, such as in the texts of 
Conventions and laws on human rights, and in the witnessing, reports and films of 
rights being violated or honoured. Universal rights have gradually been defined over 
centuries through repeated public protests against oppression and injustice, and 
have been refined and clarified through legal and philosophical debate. The UNCRC 
is almost universally agreed and ratified, and it can have real political and practical 
effects when people work to implement it in the courts and in public life and policy. 
Even if the 1998 Human Rights Act were to be repealed by its opponents, the 
precedence of many court cases since 2000, based on the Act, ensure its lasting 
existence and influence in English common law. 
  The second level combines the empirical with actual events, in which rights are 
central. For example, the Arab protests occurred in the most water stressed 
countries on earth (Carrington, 2011). Long-term drought, wells that are emptying 
the centuries-old deep aquifers, water pollution, the rising cost of oil to fire 
desalination plants, and the privatisation and costly sale of water, all threaten the 
human right to safe drinking water (UNCRC, 1989, Article 24,2c). This right 
exemplifies how all rights are interrelated, and inhere in human bodies. The right to 
clean water relates to rights to life, food, and an adequate standard of living, as well 
as to the services, infrastructure, and political economy necessary to support rights 
to utilities, healthcare, and education, which enable freedom of information and 
expression, and a life of human dignity and fulfilment from birth (United Nations, 
1989). All these rights are expressed and exercised, honoured, ignored or violated 
through bodies, and also through how bodies are respected and nurtured, or 
deprived, confined, tortured or enslaved. Rights to freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion (United Nations, 1989:14) affect babies, for example, through respect for 
their family’s right to worship, to free association, and to attend the welcoming 
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ceremonies that many religious communities hold for their newborn members, 
without fear of discrimination or persecution (Alderson, 2008).   
  Most social research remains at the vital but limited two levels of the empirical and 
actual (Bhaskar, 1998), which trace associations between observed things, events 
and effects. The equivalent in physics would be to record numerous falling objects, 
and to search misleadingly within them and their constant conjunctions for the cause 
of the falling. However, causal powers and explanations lie at the deeper third level, 
which combines the empirical, the actual and the real. Natural and social objects and 
structures are real in having causal powers that can generate real events.   
  Gravity and evolution are examples of causes, which cannot be seen or proved in 
themselves, only in their effects, as in falling objects for gravity, or finches’ beaks 
that change over generations for evolution. We readily accept invisible not directly 
provable causes in the natural sciences. Bhaskar (1998) argues that invisible causes 
in the social sciences are equally valid: inequality, class, ‘race’, gender, and adult-
child relations. In social research, to follow Newton or Darwin we would stop trying to 
trace and measure innumerable empirical (observable) correlations between data in 
the birth cohorts, such as personal connections between children whose parents 
encourage early language, and those who later do well at school (Feinstein, 2003). 
That is like trying to find causal patterns and associations between falling objects. 
Instead like natural scientists looking for the deeper cause and consistent 
explanation of gravity, social researchers would consider class and inequality as 
underlying real causal, political explanations.   
  A common argument against identifying poverty and class as reliable causes is that 
some very disadvantaged children succeed well, and some privileged children fail 
badly. Therefore, conclude the critics, class is not a definite or strong influence, 
whereas personal motivation is. CR responds with the concepts of closed and open 
systems (Bhaskar, 1998). First, there are very few closed systems that have 
inevitable, 100 per cent effects. Water does not boil everywhere at 100oC; cancer 
drug controlled trials produce a range of outcomes and survival rates. Second, a 
single isolated system is also very rare: air currents and aerodynamics can work 
against gravity; in society, innumerable known and unknown influences interact and 
affect people. Third, social systems are open because they involve unpredictable, 
thinking, choosing, reacting people, not predictable molecules in a test tube. 
However, CR still considers that deep causes such as class, despite their varying 
albeit majority effects, are powerful and crucial. We should avoid the double 
standard of accepting unseen powers such as gravity in physics, but rejecting 
unseen powers such as class in sociology.   
  In sociological debates about structure and agency either strong structures 
dominate weak agents or (mainly in strand 2) strong agents select and produce 
structures and “construct childhoods”. CR distinguishes between conscious, 
intentional agents and the non-living structures they inhabit; structures powerfully 
enable but also constrain agents. As agents we cannot “construct” children, or 
childhood which is an ancient historical, biological and social kinship structure we all 
unavoidably inherit. We can, however, keep reconstructing and transforming our 
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local beliefs and behaviours about childhood. Bhaskar and Marx also examine how 
agents’ efforts to alter structures are likely to be unintended, inadvertent and 
unsuccessful in the constant dialectic between structure and agency. Social 
structures cannot exist without human agency; agents cannot exist without social 
structures of language, kinship and learning. But neither of these can be reduced 
into or confused with the other. They are interdependent but different. Human rights 
involve real and aspirational structures of justice, freedom and equity, besides 
human agents, who claim, respect, negotiate or deny rights, refine and implement 
them. The next section considers the long history of the emerging structure of human 
rights.      
 
Four planar social being 
A major division in sociology, reviewed earlier, is between large-scale, impersonal 
cohort and structural research (strands 1 and 4), and small-scale, personal studies 
(strand 2). CR offers ways to combine these approaches into more holistic and 
coherent analysis of rights, through the four interacting planes of social being 
(Bhaskar, 2008:153).  
   Plane I concerns physical bodies in the natural world. In the earlier example of 
water, the ontology of all interrelated rights resonates with the ontology and 
flourishing of both human nature and the global ecology in which it survives. If rights 
are inalienable, and therefore universal, they relate to the universal nature and 
needs of human beings as rights holders. The Kantian view, that only rational “Man” 
has rights, falls into the epistemic fallacy, because it largely defines rights as matters 
understood and exercised through the intellect. It ignores how bodies are also 
involved, and excludes most human beings, especially the most vulnerable, for 
whom rights-claims are often most necessary. The gradual inclusion over history of 
all adult groups as rights holders, however disabled they may be, increases the case 
for including young, “pre-social” children.  
  Yet philosophers’ visions of “pre-social” children, with blank pages or buzzing 
confusion for minds, have been refuted by psychological research on baby’s highly 
social responses: their sensitive awareness and communication; their intense 
curiosity and predisposition from the start to find meaning and patterns in what they 
see, hear and feel; their “autonomy” in firmly expressed views, protests and smiles 
(Murray and Andrews, 2000). Even premature babies have a “language”, that adults 
can “read”. They remember, from before birth, their parents’ voices, which they 
prefer to other voices (Als, 1999; Alderson et al., 2005).There is also babies’ concern 
for others (Stern, 1977), which soon finds expression in a rudimentary sense of 
sympathy-solidarity and fairness-justice, in their conflict and resistance, being “good” 
and “naughty” (Dunn, 2004), all responses connected with rights. Babies’ essentially 
social and not simply egotistical nature is shown in how they use other people’s 
names for months before saying their own name.  
  One related question is when does each human spirit or unique identity first 
emerge? Martin and Barresi (2006) review how, over millennia, concepts of an 
immortal and possibly sacred soul have gradually fragmented into the contemporary 
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Goffmanesque performing persona. They cite how Plato and others could only 
account for the human intellect by believing in its prenatal existence because 
children’s mathematical and philosophical powers seem to precede and exceed their 
education. The mysterious, unique person that many parents sense within each new 
baby cannot wholly be explained by genetics (Midgley, 2010).         
  Plane 2 of social being, interpersonal subjective relationships between individuals 
and groups, expands on the social aspects of human nature. Modern rights might 
encode very recent versions and norms of human relationships that have origins in 
prehistoric human communities, as well as in seemingly innate human dispositions. 
Both these historical and psychological beginnings would suggest that rights are 
integral to human nature and relationships, rather than being superficial, expendable 
ideas. This is not to say that, much before the twentieth century, people held 
conscious concepts of modern, equal, international rights, any more than of Freudian 
analysis. However, ideas relating to rights (and to psychoanalysis) were debated in 
classical Greek and Hindu drama and poetry, and respect and freedoms seem 
always to have been accorded at least to certain groups such as kings and priests, in 
master-slave relationships (Bhaskar, 2008). Intuitive recognition, with acceptance or 
negotiation of hierarchies, dominance and subservience, honour or contempt, may 
be inextricable elements of human interactions. Rights are then a device to increase 
the groups deemed to deserve respect “for their worth and dignity”, from aristocrats 
in the past to everyone today.  
  The philosopher Mary Midgley (2010) draws on Darwin’s theories of early human 
relationships, not in terms of unchanging, stone-age, human biology, but in seeing 
humans as social animals with much in common with complex pack, herd and flock 
species, with their “pecking order”. This approach argues that we do not have 
language and reason because we are clever, but because we are intensely sociable. 
We are innately predisposed to relate, share and communicate like other animals, 
and additionally we reflect self-consciously and imaginatively, and feel guilt and 
regret, shame and pride. These activities and emotions relate tacitly or overtly to 
shared respect for everyone’s rights. 
  Within personal relationships, babies’ rights to basic provisions and protections to 
enable them to survive are generally supported. The contested children’s rights tend 
to be the freedom and autonomy rights, with concern that these might allow children 
to harm themselves and others. However, this opposition stems from centuries of 
prejudice that children and young people - and women - are ignorant, emotional, 
irrational and unreliable. These stereotypes have been dispelled for women, and are 
being increasingly challenged by researchers and other adults who work and care for 
young children (reviewed in Mayall, 2002; Alderson, 2008). Human nature at all ages 
combines strong and weak qualities, and human rights are not denied to foolish 
adults.    
  Plane 3 of social being involves broader social relations and inherited structures, 
which suggest that, explicitly recognised or not, experiences relating to rights are 
woven into human history. Woodiwiss (2005) traced modern inalienable rights and 
respect for human dignity back to ancient, formal religious rites and beliefs in the 
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soul, and in God-given respect for the sacred in human nature. Nisbet (1967:221-
263) considered  that sociology is the only social science to examine how religio-
sacred myth, ritual, and sacrament inform secular life, and to perceive human nature 
and society as intrinsically moral, instead of assuming that secular, economic, 
utilitarian, self-interested, and competitive doctrines are “the essential and sufficing 
pillars of social analysis” (1967:221). Nisbet reviewed classical sociologists’ 
contentions that religions implant a deep sense of unity and meaning, social order 
and duty, the sacred bonds of the social contract, together with respect for 
individuality and true human nature, wisdom and virtue, which are safeguards from 
paralysing fear, disorder, and tyranny. They anticipate Gearty’s view of modern 
rights cited earlier.    
  Whether they take a Hobbsian view of the war of all against all that can only be 
controlled by the state, or Rousseau’s romantic ideal of the unspoiled child of nature, 
the idea of primitive barbarity or a former idyllic golden age, these versions of 
prehistory share three themes that relate to human nature and rights: human identity 
(plane 1), social relationships (plane 2) and organised society (plane 3). Rights are 
especially important in the third theme, as they primarily concern states’ duties to 
protect and provide for the citizens and also to respect their freedoms. This involves 
managing diverse groups and conflict, besides promoting the human energy, 
curiosity and initiative that benefit the whole society.   
  However, the historian, Christopher Goodey (2011), has traced a common theme 
across societies, which challenges equal rights, when an upper stratum has long 
been distinguished: in terms of honour in classical times, merging much later into 
notions of the Christian elect versus the reprobate, and transforming into modern 
meritocratic concepts of the intelligent versus the intellectually disabled. This partly 
explains the continuing paternalism that restricts recognition of children’s rights 
(Goodey, 2011:327-9). 
  Plane 4 in the stratified, embodied human personality concerns personal freedom 
of conscience and agency, working towards the flourishing good life for all in the 
good society. Often dismissed as vaguely Utopian, the good society has detailed, 
agreed maps of the society and the routes towards it enshrined in human rights. 
There is not space here to discuss this complex plane and further ideas from CR 
about the momentum and direction of social agency and change (Alderson, in 
press).     
 
 
Conclusion  
 
This paper has considered possible reasons for sociology’s relative silence on rights 
and on the Holocaust as a catalyst, explanation and validation of international human 
rights. The paper has also considered the literal meaning of inalienable human rights 
for everyone from birth, and possible obstacles to developing a sociology of rights. 
These include dichotomies - adult/child, social/pre-social, culture/nature, mind/body, 
personal/political, value-free/bias, structure/agency, universal/contingent, 
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empirical/interpretive, micro/macro – which can divert sociologists into presenting 
one-sided, half-way and misleading accounts, and can also deter analysis of 
complex entities such as human rights and childhood, which transcend the 
dichotomies. Babies as rights-holders raise questions about nature and culture, 
innate and learned capacities, and the meaning of human worth and dignity, which 
involve thinking beyond the bounds of sociology, across the humanities and the 
social and natural sciences.     
   Present dichotomies and boundaries may partly be attributed to sociologists’ 
efforts to control chaotic everyday life, and divide it into manageable portions for 
social analysis. There may also be aversion to confronting real mayhem and 
suffering, such as wars and genocides, which painfully challenge sociologists’ 
confidence to make sense of dangerous and unjust societies. It is as if many 
sociologists have withdrawn from a largely unacknowledged chaos or absence at the 
heart of society and of sociology, into opposing directions: towards functionalist 
denial of injustice, or retreat from the political into the personal, towards rejection of 
reality and therefore of real physical suffering, or into defence against fascism 
through neo-liberalism. These responses all sideline human rights. They also 
challenge sociology’s coherence and internal and public credibility by locking 
sociologists into contradictory positions between the extremes of positivist faith in a 
pristine, stable, transferable, factual reality versus interpretive attention to personal 
perceptions and constructions of contingent, transient interactions (Bhaskar, 1989, 
2008; Scott, 2010). 
  CR offers approaches that address the gaps, bridge dichotomies, and close 
contradictions, towards strengthening theory and research on human rights. The 
approaches include exploring absence, four planar social being that unites human 
nature and relationships, agency, structures and flourishing, besides distinguishing 
transitive epistemology from intransitive ontology, and recognising the reality of 
textual, legal, political, interactional, embodied and causal human rights. Broad, 
universal, intransitive principles in UN rights treaties are open to transitive local 
negotiation and application, to which sociologists could vitally contribute (Freeman, 
2011) to help to reverse the present great shifts of resources and power away from 
younger and towards to older generations. Rather than belittling human rights, future 
research about younger generations may increase interdisciplinary understanding of 
the political and embodied nature and purpose of inalienable human rights.   
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